

## CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

ORIG :  
UNIT :  
EXT : 603  
DATE : 16 JUNE 1954

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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| 2 |  | 5 |  |
| 3 |  | 6 |  |

TO : SENIOR REF, LINCOLN

FROM: DIR, CIA

CONF: DD/P (L) (1)

INFO: DCI (2), D/DCI (3), WH (PBS) (4-6), WH (7), SA/PC/DCI (8) }

DIR 05142 (OUT 54470)

2050Z 16 JUN 54

PRIORITY  
PRECEDENCE

TO: SLINC

CITE: DIR

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

REFS A. LINC 3908 (IN 18452)

B. LINC 3909 (IN 18453)

1. GUIDANCE PROVIDED REF A MAKES EXCELLENT SENSE TO US. IT APPEARS  
FROM HERE YOU MAY BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC SPECIFYING 18 JUNE AS DATE  
COMPLETION PRE-D-DAY AIR SUPPLY AND ACTIVATION MINIMUM COMMO CAPABILITY.

2. WE AGREE GENERALLY WITH YOUR ANALYSIS OF SITUATION AS SET FORTH  
REF B AND HAVE NO POLICY OBJECTION TO SCHEDULED TIMING. AGREE SPECIFICALLY  
THAT CRUX WHOLE ISSUE CONTINUES TO BE POSITION WSBURNT ARMED FORCES  
CONCERNING WHICH WE MUST HAVE CLEARER FAVORABLE INDICATIONS BEFORE KICK-OFF.  
THIS SUPERSEDES ALL OTHER REASONS FOR ADDITIONAL DELAY ALTHOUGH ACHIEVEMENT  
SOME DEGREE OPERATIONAL READINESS WOULD APPEAR ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR  
ACTION.

3. IF EVIDENCE CONCERNING POSITION OF MILITARY INDICATES IT SOLIDLY  
BEHIND REGIME THERE IS NO DOUBT IN OUR MIND THAT CALLIGERIS' FORCES IN  
EXTERIOR AND IF POSSIBLE IN INTERIOR MUST BE RESTRAINED FROM MOUNTING  
ATTACK SINCE ATTACK UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD RESULT IN CERTAIN

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

## CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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TO :

FROM :

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO

DIR 05142 (OUT 54470)

PRECEDENCE

DEFEAT ACCOMPANIED BY MOST HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES AFFECTING ALL ASPECTS REPEAT ALL ASPECTS WSBURNT PROBLEM. THIS IS THE ONE THING WE MUST AVOID AND ALL EFFORTS MUST BE DEVOTED TO THIS END INCLUDING IMPOSITION OF SPECIALLY DEVISED RESTRAINTS UPON CALLIGERIS, ETC. FOR USE IN ARGUMENTS TO CONVINCE CALLIGERIS AND ASSOCIATES IT SHOULD BE BROUGHT HOME TO HIM THAT HIS OWN INABILITY TO PRODUCE ~~THE~~ RECEPTION PARTIES ETC. REVEAL GREAT WEAKNESS AND POSSIBLY NON-EXISTENCE HIS CLAIMED INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT ALL SUPPORT WILL BE WITHDRAWN IF HE PERSISTS. AT SAME TIME THE ALTERNATIVE COURSE ENVISIONED IN LYNADÉ'S PAPER SHOULD BE FORCIBLY ADVANCED AS THE ONLY CONCEIVABLE COURSE OF ACTION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. CALLIGERIS SHOULD BE ASSURED OF CONTINUING SUPPORT ON THIS BASIS AND NO OTHER.

TO US  
4. MEANING OF PARAS 4 AND 5 REF B NOT CLEAR/~~ZEES~~, AND IN PRESENT FORM SEEM SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENT WITH PARA 3. PARA 5 COULD BE READ AS MEANING THAT FAILURES OF ADEQUATE READINESS PREPARATIONS AND OTHER FOUL-UPS ARE JUSTIFICATION FOR COMMITTING ALL RESOURCES TO ACTION. PLEASE CLARIFY.

END OF MESSAGE

[ ]  
FRANK G. WISNER  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~  
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